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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal of the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants/Respondents the Estate of Mary Steele ("Mary Steele") and Amber Steele. The 
judgment dismissed Plaintiffs/Appellants Stephen Boswell's and Karena Boswell's ("Boswells") 
claims for strict liability, negligence, negligence per se and premises liability claims. Mr. Boswell 
was Mary Steele's son-in-law1 and Karena Steele her daughter. Amber Steele is Mary Steele's 
granddaughter and Karena Boswell's niece. The Boswells' claims stemmed from an incident 
involving Amber Steele's dog Zoey. 
After a social gathering at the Boswells' home, Mr. Boswell drove Mary Steele home. When 
Mr. Boswell entered the home, he saw Zoey, who was completely enclosed behind a gate in the 
kitchen. Zoey was also barking and growling, yet despite this, Mr. Boswell approached Zoey, with 
a closed fit, reached over the gate and was bitten. 
The District Court c01Tectly concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact that Idaho 
has never adopted strict liability as to dog bite cases; that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
that Mary Steele and Amber Steele were neither negligent nor negligent per se, as there was no 
evidence that they owed any duty to the Mr. Boswell or even if they had that they breached any duty; 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact that under the premises liability claim, Mr. Boswell 
was a social guest-licensee, not an invitee; and that there was no genuine issue of material fact that 
Mary Steele passed away subsequent to the filing of the Boswells' complaint. 
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Zoey was not dangerous. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
On September 24, 2012, the Boswells filed their initial complaint, asserting negligence, 
unreasonable risks, negligence per se pursuant to Idaho Code §25-2805, and premises liability. R., 
pp. 14-18. Mary Steele and Amber Steele filed their answer denying any liability. R., pp. 20-23. 
Subsequent thereto, on December 24, 2012, the Boswells filed a motion to amend their 
complaint, to which Mary Steele and Amber Steele objected, to add claims for strict liability and 
negligence per se under the Pocatello City Code related to dog bites. R., pp. 39-48; 49-72; 103-105. 
On April 10, 2014, the District Comi granted the Boswells' motion, and set the matter for trial. R., 
pp. 143-153. The Boswells filed an Amended Complaint, as well as a motion for partial summary 
judgment, asse1iing there was no genuine issue of fact that Mary Steele and Amber Steele were 
strictly liable, that Mr. Boswell was an invitee, and that Mary and Amber Steele's affinnative 
defense of comparative fault was inapplicable. R., pp. 73-87; 125-133; 331-349; 409-412. 
On July 12, 2013, Mary Steele and Amber Steele filed their motion for summary judgment, 
asserting there was no genuine issue of material fact that Idaho did not allow for strict liability in dog 
bite cases; that they owed no duty to the Boswells; that even if a duty were owed, they did not breach 
that duty; and that they were not negligent or negligent per se. R., pp. 160-242. Also, on July 16, 
2013, a hearing was held on Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's motion to quash the deposition 
subpoenaofJohn Billquist, an adjuster for Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's insurance carrier, State 
Fann. R., 245. Mary Steele and Amber Steele asse1ied that the Boswells were not allowed to depose 
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Mr. Billquist, as he was an adjuster for State Fann, and his actions were protected under the work 
product privilege, as well as the fact that the responsive letter he sent to the Boswells' counsel's 
settlement demand letter was protected under Idaho Rule of Evidence 408. Tr., p.2, 1.2-p. 3, 1.9; p. 
8, 1.24-p.9, 1.18. The District Comi granted the motion and quashed the subpoena. R., p. 245. Tr., 
p. 10, 11.12-21. 
Mary Steele and Amber Steele opposed the Boswells' motion for partial summary judgment, 
and filed motions to strike the Affidavits of Mr. Boswell, Mrs. Boswell and Tamara Andersen, a 
City of Pocatello Animal Control officer who responded to the dog bite. R., pp. 247-309; 350-353. 
The Boswells filed a memorandum and affidavits in opposition to Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's 
motion for summary judgment and in opposition to the motion to strike affidavits. R., pp. 310-
327;413-428. 
On August 5, 2013, a hearing was held on the parties' respective motions for summary 
judgment and motions to strike. R., p. 454. On October 30, 2013, the District Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision & Order granting Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's motion for summary 
judgment and motion to strike the Tamara Andersen affidavit. R., pp. 455-466. Thereafter, on 
January 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the Boswells' motion for reconsider. R., p. 481. On 
February 25, 2014, the District Court filed its memorandum decision denying the Boswells' motion 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 3 
to reconsider. R., pp. 483-488. The District Court then entered the Final Judgement on March 14, 
2014. R., p. 489. The Boswells appealed. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
1. Mary Steele put up "Beware of Dog" signs to the gates of her property. R., p. 187 
(Mary Steele Deposition Transcript p. 17, 11.20-23). 
2. Mary Steele and Amber Steele did not know that Zoey was dangerous2 or vicious,3 
or that she would bite Mr. Boswell. R., pp.185-86(Mary Steele Depo. p.12, 11.5-13; p. 13, 11. 10-15). 
Prior to the incident on October 8, 2011, there had been no complaints or any adjudication thatZoey 
was dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation.4 Zoey nipped at a friend of Amber Steele's, 
Chris Kettler, but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards Amber Steele and was 
being protective of her. R., pp. 71-72. Also, prior to the incident, Mary Steele never saw Zoey bare 
2 
Under Pocateilo City Code 6.04.0lOA, Band C define "dangerous" as an "animal which, when 
unprovoked by teasing, taunting or a threatening manner by an person approaches said person in 
an apparent attitude of attack .... or any animal with a known propensity, tendency or disposition 
to attack unprovoked ... or any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults or otherwise attacks a 
human being ... without justifiable provocation[.]"[Emphasis supplied]. 
3Idaho Code §25-2805 defines vicious as a dog, "which, when not physically provoked, 
physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing .... " 
[Emphasis supplied]. 
4 
This is required under Pocatello City Code 6.04.050A. Also, under Idaho Code §25-28-5(2) a person 
is guilty of owning a vicious dog where it is established the dog bites or injures a person, "when not 
physically provoked[.]"[Emphasis supplied]. 
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her teeth. R., p. 189 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 26, 11.2-3). 
3. Mary Steele had a fenced-in backyard to keep Zoeyonherprope1iy. ld.,p. 11, ll.5-9. 
4. Zoey was owned by Amber Steele, who kept Zoey in the basement almost every day 
and all day long. R., p.229 (Karena Boswell Deposition, pp. 7-8). 
5. Mr. Boswell was well acquainted with Zoey prior to the incident. R., p.214 (Stephen 
Boswell Deposition p. 12, 11. 7-14). Zoey let Mr. Boswell pet her before and he held her on his lap 
and she showed him affection. R., 189-90 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 26, 1.20-p. 27,1.1). 
6. On the date of the incident, Mr. Boswell picked up Mary Steele to take her to his and 
Mrs. Boswell's home for a family gathering. R., p.184 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 6, 11. 17-20; R., p. 217 
(Stephen Boswell Depo., p. 23, 1.17-p.24, 1.23). Amber Steele was not at Mary Steele's home at the 
time Mary and Mr. Boswell were there. R., p. 190 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 32, 11.8-1 O; R., 221 
(Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 37, 1.10-12; R., p. 235 (Karena Boswell Depo. p. 30, 11.6-8). 
7. Before Mary Steele left her home, she placed Zoeybehind a gate in the kitchen of her 
home, and Zoey was completely confined, and not loose, when she and Mr. Boswell returned. Rp. 
184 (Maiy Steele Depo. p. 7, 1.2-p. 8, 1.18); R,pp. 208-209; R., 514, Exhibits 1-4. Zoey was confined 
and penned in behind the gate and in an area she was supposed to be. R., l 86(Mary Steele Depo. 
p. 14, 11.3-13; R., 192 (Ma1y Steele Depo. p. 40, 11. 10-13),·R., 514, Exhibits 1-4. 
8. When Mr. Boswell and Mmy Steele returned, they entered Mary's home, and, prior 
to the bite, Zoey was barking and growling. R., 184 (Maiy Steele Depo. p. 6, 11. 21-25). 
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9. Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary Steele's knowledge or at her request, 
approached Zoey, who was behind the gate, with his right hand in a closed fist. R., 219-20 
(Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 29, 1.7-p. 33, 1.5)( emphasis supplied). Mr. Boswell reached to Zoey and 
she bit him. 
10. Mr. Boswell admitted that there was no reason for him to go beyond the gate, and that 
Mary never asked him to go to Zoey, and he decided on his own to go to Zoey. R., p.185 & 192 
(Mary Steele Depo. p. 12; p. 40, 11. 14-18; R., 218 (Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 25, 11.22-24). 
11. The Boswells both admitted that they knew that Mary Steele and Amber Steele kept 
Zoey in the basement, and did not think Mary Steele did anything wrong in keeping Zoey in a fenced 
in back yard or behind the gate in her house. R., p.215 ( Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 13, 11. 6-7; p. 16, 
11.11-19; R., p. 232 & 238 (Karena Boswell Depo. p. 19, 11.2-6; p. 42, 1.10-p. 43, 1.3). Even more 
telling is that Mr. Boswell admitted he did not believe Mary Steele was negligent, as he testified, "I 
don't think she [Mary] did anything wrong." R., 220 (Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 35, 1.25-p.35, 
l.l)(emphasis supplied). Mrs. Boswell admitted while she was around Zoey she and did not have 
any concerns. R., p.232 (Karena Boswell Depo. p. 17, 11.19-23). Mrs. Boswell also admitted she 
could not say Mary Steele's or Amber Steele's leaving Zoey in the kitchen behind the gate was an 
act of negligence, actually thought it was reasonable to keep a gate/banier to keep the dogs 
se6,regated, and could not be critical of Mary Steele in her actions. R., p. 237 (Karena Boswell Depo. 
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p. 42, 1.1 0-p.43, 1.3). Mrs. Boswell also could not say whether the bite was unpredictable or not to 
Mary or Amber. R., p. 23 5 (Karena Boswell Depo. p. 3 3, 11. 1-8). 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Comi c01Tectly grant summary judgment in concluding that Idaho 
has never adopted strict liability in dog bite cases? 
2. Did the District Court conectly conclude there was no genuine issue of material fact 
that Mary Steele and Amber Steele were not negligent, as they owed no duty to Mr. Boswell, where 
they did not have any knowledge or notice that Zoey was a dangerous or vicious animal, where they 
kept Zoey completely enclosed behind a gate in the kitchen of the home, and where Mr. Boswell 
approached Zoey, who was barking and growling, with a closed fist? 
3. Did the District Court conectly conclude that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact that neither Mary Steele nor Amber Steele had knowledge or notice that Zoey was a dangerous 
or vicious animal, where she was completely enclosed behind a gate in the kitchen of the home and 
where Mr. Boswell approached Zoey, who was barking and growling, with a closed fist? 
4. Did the District Comi conectly conclude that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact that Mr. Boswell was a social guest/licensee, that Mary Steele did not owe a duty to Mr. 
Boswell, and even if she had, that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Mary Steele 
breached any duty, where Zoey was completely enclosed behind a gate in the kitchen of the home, 
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where Mr. Boswell did not consider Zoey to be dangerous or vicious, and where Mr. Boswell 
approached Zoey, who was barking and growling, with a closed fist? 
5. Did the District Court correctly strike the Affidavit of Tamara Andersen, pursuant 
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), where Ms. Andersen's affidavit was conclusory, lacked 
foundation and based on pure speculation? 
6. Did the District Court correctly grant the motion to quash the deposition subpoena 
of John Billquist, where there was no evidence that neither the attorney-client nor work product 
p1ivileges were waived? 
7. Are Amber Steele and Mary Steele entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal, 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving paiiy is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.'" Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,718,918 
P.2d 583,587 (1996) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,890 P.2d 
331 (1995). In making this detennination, a court should liberally construe the record in favor of 
the pmiy opposing the motion and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's 
favor. Smith, 128 Idaho at 718,918 P.2d at 587 (citingFrielv. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho 
484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994)). Based on the evidence, if reasonable persons could reach 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 8 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, summary judgment must be denied. Id. ( citing 
Harris v. Department of Health and We/fare, 123 Idaho 295,298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)). 
However, if the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summaryjud,gment should 
be granted. Id., 128 Idaho at 718-719,918 P.2d at 587-88 ( citing Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 
434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991)). 
Fmiher, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, asserting there is no genuine issue 
of material fact as to an element of a plaintiffs case, the plaintiff "must establish the existence of 
an issue of fact regarding that element." Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of4merica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 
854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 (1996). Moreover, the non-moving paiiy "has the burden of presenting 
sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue which arises from the facts, and a genuine issue of fact 
is not created by a mere scintilla of evidence." Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 955-956, 842 P.2d 
288, 291-292 (Ct. App. 1992) (internal citations omitted). "Ifthemovingpartyfails to challenge an 
element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of genuine issue of material fact on that 
element, the burden does not shift to the nomnoving party, and the nonmoving party is not required 
to respond with suppo1iing evidence." Smith, supra, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588 (citing 
Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530, 887 P.2d at 1038)). Fmiher, "a nomnoving paiiy's failure to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that paiiy's case, on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. Jarman, supra, 
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122 Idaho at 955-956, 842 P.2d at291-292. (Internal citations omitted). Thus, where the non-moving 
party fails, by way of affidavit or deposition, to make a sufficient showing to establish an essential 
element to its case, "there can be no 'genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure 
of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial." Id. 
In this matter, Mr. Boswell and Mrs. Boswell failed to meet their burden on sununary 
jud,gment, as they failed to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of the elements of 
their claims. The District Court's granting summary judgment to Mary Steele and Amber Steele, 
and denial of Mr. Boswell's and Mrs. Boswell's motion for reconsideration must be affinned. 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IDAHO HAS 
NEVER ADOPTED STRICT LIABILITY IN DOG BITE CASES. 
The District Court properly granted smmnary judgment on the Boswells' strict liability claim, 
as the Idaho courts have never adopted or applied strict liability to dog bite or premises liability 
cases. 
Idaho has only adopted the concept of strict liability in cases dealing with a seller of a 
defective product to a consumer. This was set forth in the case of Shields v. Morton Chemical 
Company, 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974). In that case, this Court adopted a concept of strict 
liability in to1is as stated in the Restatement of To1is 2nd § 402a, which pertained to a seller of a 
defective product to a consumer. The seller needs to be engaged in the business of selling the 
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product and the product is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it was sold. See Shields, 95 Idaho at 676, 518 P.2d at 859. While Idaho has 
continued to adopt the concept of strict liability, it is has been within the confines of the Restatement 
of Tmis 2nd § 402a concept. Idaho has not adopted strict liability in dog bite cases. 
In their opening brief, the Boswells give short shrift to to McClain v. Lev-.1iston Interstate Fair 
and Racing Association, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909) in suppmi of their position on appeal. 
However, McClain does not impose strict liability. In McClain, this Court dealt with two causes 
of action, negligence and trespass. In 1909, this Court did not expand the concept of negligence and 
trespass5 to impose strict liability. The Boswells'' argument to the contra1y is an erroneous reading 
of the case. The quote on page 79 of the McClain decision must be read in its proper context. That 
context puts the quote as follows: 
One of the early cases in this country considering the legal principles 
involved in the case at bar, under the facts as alleged in the complaint, is that 
of Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 3 22, 69 Am. Dec. 99, and in our opinion states 
the rule correctly as follows: "If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, 
injure anyone, in person or property, if they are righ(fully in the place where 
they do the mischief, the owner of such animals is not liable for such injury, 
unless he knew that they were accustomed to do mischief. And in suits for 
such injuries, such knowledge must be alleged, and proved. For unless the 
owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such 
knowledge he is liable." 
"The owner of domestic animals, if they are wrongfully in the place 1-vhere 
they do any mischief, is liable for it, though he had no notice that they had 
In citing to McClain, Mary ~teele and Amber Steele do not acknowledge, but rather continue to 
oppose that they were negligent in any manner, as will be discussed in more detail in the remainder 
of this brief. In addition, the Boswells have never asserted any trespass claim. 
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been accustomed to do so before. In cases of this kind the ground of the 
action is, that the animals were wrongfully in the place where the injury was 
done. And it is not necessary to allege or prove any knowledge on the part 
of the owner, that they had previously been vicious." 
This case clearly draws the distinction between that class of cases cited by 
counsel for appellant and that class of cases coming under the allegation of 
the complaint in this case. Where it is alleged, as in the case at bar, that the 
animal is wrongfully at the place where the mischief is done, the owner is 
liable for the damage done, if any, although he had no notice that such animal 
possessed the trait or characteristic of doing the particular thing which caused 
the injury. The right of action arises by reason of the fact that as against the 
plaintiff the animal causing the injury is a trespasser, is unlawfully at the 
place where the injury occurs and at which place the plaintiff has a legal right 
to be. So in the case at bar the allegations of the complaint are to the effect 
that the plaintiff was invited by the fair association to engage in riding a race 
upon the grounds controlled by the fair association and at a time when the air 
association was conducting its fair, thus clearly showing the plaintiff to be a 
licensee upon the racetrack at the time the accident occmTed. Then follow 
the allegations that the defendants unlawfullv, wrongfully, negligentlv and 
wantonly pennitted the do2 in controversy to go upon, run over such 
racetrack and come in contact with the horse ridden bv the plaintiff which 
occasioned and caused the injury for which damages are sought. Under these 
facts it was not necessary to allege or prove any particular trait or 
characteristic of the dog, or that the defendants had knowledge that such dog, 
or the class of dogs to which the same belonged, possessed any peculiar trait 
or characteristic, or the trait or characteristic which led it to the place and to 
do the act which caused the injury. (Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322, 69 
Am,. Dec. 99; Chunot v. Larson, 43 Wis. 536, 28 Am. Rep. 567, 2 Cyc. 373; 
1 Thompson on Neg., 888.) These authorities seem to be in line with the 
reason of the case. 
McClain, 17 Idaho at 79-80, 104 P. at 1020-21 [italics in original][underscore supplied]. 
Ifidaho were adopting a strict liability standard in 1909, this Court certainly would not have 
phrased its holding in tenns of the status of the allegations in the complaint which were negligence 
and trespass by a dog and its owner. In fact, strict liability was not pled in 1909 in McClain; it was 
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not the legal theory in 1909, and is not the holding of McClain .. This is clearly indicated when this 
Court, in McClain, discussed its holding as opposed to a discussion of the Decker v. Gammon, 44 
Me. 322, 69 Am. Dec. 99, case. On pages 81 and 82, this Court issued its true holding in which it 
clearly supported that liability in ~McClain is based on theo1ies of negligence and trespass. In that 
regard, this Comi stated: 
The dog is generally recognized as an essential paii of every well-regulated 
family, and of a higher degree of intelligence than other domestic animals, 
and given privileges not generally conceded to other members of the animal 
family. But we are inclined to the opinion that notwithstanding this fact, and 
notwithstanding the fact that the dog occupies a higher position in the social 
world of the animal family, and an impo1iant one in human affairs, still that 
the owner of such animal should not be excused from liability for injuries 
done by the dog when invading the rights of person or property. This 
position that the dog has well earned, by reason of his heroic acts and deeds 
of valor, might be a reason for exacting from the owner a higher duty as to 
responsibility for the dog's acts, but it certainly is not a reason why the owner 
of such animal should be not equally responsible for the wrongs done by a 
dog as for wrongs done by other domestic animals. And we believe, both 
upon reason and authority, that when a dog invades and trespasses upon the 
legal rights of a person and injures person or property, and such invasion and 
trespass is the result of the negligence of the owner, the owner is liable for the 
damages done. Emphasis supplied. 
17 Idaho at 81-82. 104 P. at 1021. 
Clearly, this Court in McClain did not expand the pleadings of the plaintiff from negligence 
and trespass to strict liability. There has been no case cited by the Boswells since McClain to 
indicate that this Comi has adopted strict liability in dog bite cases, and this Comi should not do so 
here. 
The Boswells cite to non-binding treatises for their strained interpretation of McClain as 
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holding Idaho allows for strict liability in dog bite cases. Again, the Boswells' position lacks merit. 
Again, strict liability was not pled in 1909 in McClain; it was not the legal theory in 1909, and is not 
theholdingoftheMcClain comi, as clearly indicated therein,. See, McClain, 17 Idaho at 81-82, 104 
P. At 1021. McClain never adopted or applied strict liability to dog bite or premises liability cases. 
Fmiher, ifidaho were adopting a strict liability standard in 1909, this Court certainly would not have 
phrased its holding in ten11S of the status of the allegations in the complaint which were negligence 
and trespass by a dog and its owner. And, again, under the Boswells' en-oneous position, like the 
facts in this case, a person could reach their hand into a dog pen, receive a dog bite and then have 
no responsibility for their own behavior that initiated the incident. Idaho's to1i system has never 
endorsed such lack of personal responsibility. See Idaho Code§ 6-801 et. seq. 
Further, as the Boswells fail to provide the Comi with any law in Idaho applying strict 
liability in dog bite or premises liability cases, they attempt to deflect from this by citing the Court 
to non-binding case law/statutes of other states. It appears the Boswells obtained these citations from 
some legal compilation or treatise, and did not carefully read or scrutinize them. Again, the glaring 
fact the Boswells cannot escape is that Idaho is not a strict liability state, along with Hawaii, 
Kansas, North Dakota (see, Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W. 2d 496, 501 (N.D. 1976) (premises 
liability), Vermont and Virginia. Indiana presumes a dog is harmless and applies strict liability 
only where a letter carrier is involved. Nevada actually requires two bites in an eighteen 
month period, without provocation (N.R.S. 202.500)(2013). Rhode Island only applied strict 
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liability if the dog gets out of its enclosure. DuBois v. Quilitzsch, 21 A.3d 375, 380 (R.I. 2011). 
Additionally, there are states that require the plaintiff show the owner knows or reasonably knows 
the dog is vicious or dangerous, and, of those, South Dakota-Gehrts v. Batteen, 620 N.W. 775, 778 
(S.D. 2001) and Tennessee,Fletcherv. Richardson, 603 S.W.2d 734, 735-36 held that the showing 
of knowledge was a negligence, not strict liability, theory. In Alaska, summary judgment was 
granted to the defendant animal owner, since the plaintiff knew of the animal's dangerous 
propensities (Hale v. O'Neill, 492 P.2d 101, 104 (Alaska 1971). New Mexico has a similar law to 
Alaska. Smith v. Village of Ruidoso, 994 P.2d 50, 54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). Other states held that 
provocation, comparative fault and assumption of risk theories applied in such cases (Priebe 
v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848,849 (Cal. 2006);Russo v. Zeigler, 67 A.3d 536 (Del.Sup. Ct. 2013); Dist1ict 
of Columbia (D.C. Code§ 8-1902(b)(l)(B); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. §767.04 (2013) (comparative 
fault applies); VanBeheren v. Bradley, 640 N.E. 2d 664, 666-67 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994); Fouts v. Mason, 
592 N.W.2d 33,36 (Iowa 1999); Pepper v. Triplet,864 So. 2d 181, 191-92 (Louisiana2003);Audette 
v. Comm., 829 N.E.2d 248, 255 (Mass. 2005); Hill v. Sacka, 666 N.W. 2d 282, 287-88 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2003); Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N.W. 2d 400, 403 (Minn.2011); Nebraska. Rev. Stat. 54-
601(b)(2013); Bohan v. Ritzo, 679 A.2d 597,601 (N.H. 1996). Neve1iheless, Idaho is not a strict 
liability state, and has never recognized strict liability in dog bite cases. 
Moreover, the District Comi correctly concluded the Boswells did not cite to any authority 
that expressly or implicitly establishes that Idaho has adopted strict liability in dog bite cases. 
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Much like the Boswells argued in their prior submissions, they never cited one Idaho case, including 
McClain, supra, where strict liability was recognized as a claim in a dog bite or premises liability 
case in Idaho. The Boswells asse1ied, both before the District CoUii and this Court, that because 
non-binding, treatises and foreign law allow for strict liability(most of which do not supp01i the 
Boswells' position, as previously asse1ied), then Idaho is a strict liability state. However, simply 
because there may be case law in other jurisdictions does not change the fact that such law is non-
binding auth01ity, and the only authority that is binding is Idaho law. The District CoUii ce1iainly 
recognized this, as evidenced by its citation to McClain, as follows: 
If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injure anyone, in person or 
prope1iy, if they are rightfully in the place where they so the mischief, the 
owner of such animals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew that 
they were accustomed to do mischief. And in suits for such injmies, such 
knowledge must be alleged, and proved. For unless the owner knew that the 
beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such knowledge he is 
liable. The owner of domestic animals, if they are wrongfully in the place 
where they so any mischief, if liable for it, though he has no notice that 
they had been accustomed to do so before. In cases of this kind the ground 
of the action is, that the animals were wrongfully in the place where the 
injury was done. And it is not necessary to allege or prove any knowledge on 
the pmi of the owner, that they has previously been vicious. 
Where it is alleged, as in the case at bar, that the animal is wrongfully at the 
place where the mischief is done, the owner is liable for the damage done, if 
any, although he had no notice that such animal possessed the trait or 
characteristic of doing the particular thing which caused the injury. The 
right of action arises by reason of the fact that as against the plaintiff the 
animal causing the injury is a trespasser, is unlawfully at the place where 
the injury occurs and at which place the plaintiff has a legal right to be. 
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R., pp.461-462. Further, the District Court properly explained how McClain did not establish strict 
liability: 
It appears to the Court that McClain does not establish recovery based on 
strict liability. The question presented in McClain is whether the animal 
trespassed or not. If the animal has trespassed, then the owner is strictly 
liable. If the animal has not trespassed and is lawfully where it is entitled to 
be, then the owner is only liable if they have knowledge of the vicious or 
dangerous character of the animal. There is no dispute in the record that 
Zoey was 1ightfully in Mary's kitchen. Amber stayed in Mary's home and 
Mary consented that Amber could keep Zoey in her home. At the time of the 
bite, Zoeywas in the kitchen behind the gate. Furthermore, Plaintiffs cannot 
cite to any authority that expressly or implicitly establishes that Idaho has 
adopted strict liability in dog bite cases. If Plaintiffs are to recover, it will be 
if the Defendants were negligent. 
R., p. 462. It was readily apparent to the District Court that Plaintiffs failed to cite to any Idaho law 
where strict liability has been adopted in dog bite cases or premises liability cases. Further, in 
denying the Boswells' motion for reconsideration the District Court reasoned that in McClain, 
The Court therein clearly did not hold that strict liability is the law in Idaho 
in a dog bite case such as the instant action. No Idaho case law in the 
subsequent one hundred plus years has been cited as adopting this position 
no matter how the law in other states may have developed. It is not the trial 
courts[sic] responsibility to move the law beyond that which the Idaho 
Supreme Court have [sic] previously detern1ined. 
R., p. 484. Thus, it is abundantly clear the Boswells' citations to non-binding case law, treatises and 
to the Restatement (Second and Third) of Torts lacks merit. Again, the only time strict liability has 
been allowed in Idaho is in products liability cases. See, Shields v. Morton Chemical Company, 95 
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Idaho 674,676,518 P.2d 857, 859 (1974). The District Court properly followed Idaho law, which 
does not recognize strict liability in cases other than products liability, in granting summary 
judgment. 
B. THE DISTRICT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THERE WAS NO GENUINE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT THAT MR. BOSWELL \VAS NOT AN 
INVITEE. 
Mr. Boswell was not an invitee; rather, he was a social guest or licensee, as he rendered an 
incidental service to Mary Boswell-he drove her home-and never conferred any monetary, business 
or commercial benefit to Mary Steele. A social guest is a licensee, and a guest rende1ing a minor 
incidental service to the landowner does not change the guest from being considered a licensee. 
Wilson v. Bogart, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 347 (1959). As a social guest, or licensee, a 
landowner is only required to share with the licensee laiowledge of dangerous conditions or activities 
on the land. Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 401, 732 P.2d 369, 370 (Ct. App. 1987)(emphasis 
supplied). Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that the fact that a guest may be rendering a 
minor incidental service to the host does not change the relationship between them as landowner and 
a licensee. Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545,347 P.2d at 347. See also, Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676, 
471 P.2d 63 (1970). 
In this case it is undisputed Mr. Boswell was Ms. Steele's son-in-law. R., p. 184 (Mary 
Steele Depo., p. 6, 11.7-9). It is undisputed Mr. Boswell was taking Ms. Steele home after a family 
gathering. R., p. 217 ( Stephen Boswell Depo., p.23, 1.17-p.24, 1.23). It is fmiher undisputed neither 
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Ms. Steele nor Mr. Boswell were conferring upon each other any economic benefit; rather Mr. 
Boswell was a "family member" who took Mary. Steele to and from her home for a family gathering. 
R.,p. 239 (Karena Boswell Depo., p.48, 1.4-p. 50, 1.15). This is exactly what this Court in Wilson 
contemplated as a social guest. Mr. Boswell was not receiving any remuneration. Ms. Steele was 
not conducting any business on her property. Thus, the District Comi conectly concluded that Mr. 
Boswell was a social guest/licensee. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
BOS\VELLS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR 
NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE CLAIMS. 
1. The record shows the Boswells failed to establish each element of their common 
law negligence claim. 
For a valid claim of negligence, a plaintiff must show (1) a duty, recognized bylaw, requiring 
the defendant to confonn to a ce1iain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 
com1ection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and ( 4) actual loss or damage. 
Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 392, 179 P.3d 352, 355 (Ct. App. 2008)(citing, Nation v. State, 
Dept of Corrections, 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953,965 (2007)). The Boswells failed to meet 
their burden, and have not disputed that Mary Steele put up warning signs; that she and Amber Steele 
did not know Zoey to be dangerous or vicious; that prior to the incident, there had been no 
complaints or any adjudication that Zoey was dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation; 
that Zoey nipped at a Chris Kettler, but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards 
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Amber Steele and was being protective of her; that Mary Steele and Amber Steele never saw Zoey 
bear her teeth, snarl or lunge at someone; that Mary Steele had a fenced-in back yard to keep Zoey 
on her prope1ty; that Zoey stayed in the basement or was behind the gate in the kitchen, where she 
was at the time of the incident. 
Further, the Boswells do not dispute that Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary's 
knowledge or her at her request, approached Zoey, ·who was behind the gate, with his right 
hand in a closed fist. R., 219 (Stephen Boswell Depo., p. 29, 1.7-p. 33, 1.5). Mr. Boswell reached 
to Zoey and she bit him. The Boswells do not dispute Mr. Boswell admitted that there was no reason 
for him to go beyond the gate, and that Mary Steele never asked him to go to Zoey, and he decided 
on his own to go to Zoey. R., p. 184 ( Mary Steele Depo., p. 12; p. 40, 11. 14-18; R., p.218 (Stephen 
Boswell Depa. p. 25, 11.22-24). 
Even more telling is that the Boswells admitted that they knew that Mary Steele and 
Amber Steele kept Zoey in the basement, and did not think Mary did anything wrong in 
keeping Zoey in a fenced in back yard or behind the gate in her house. R., p. 220 (Stephen 
Boswell Depo., p. 34, 1.24-p. 35, 1.1; R., 232 &238(KarenaBoswell Depo., p. 19, 11.2-6; p. 42, 1.10-p. 
43, 1.3). Mrs. Boswell admitted after the bite, she still was around Zoey and did not have any 
concerns, could not say Zoey's conduct was predictable and could not be critical of Mary Steele's 
actions. R., p. 232, 236, 238( Karena Boswell Depo., p. 17, 11. 19-23; p. 33, 11. 1-8; p. 42, 1.1 0-p.43, 
1.3). 
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The District Comi conectly concluded that Mr. Boswell was a social guest, not an invitee. 
R., 465-66; 484, 485. In its decisions, the District Court c01Tectly outlined the elements of 
negligence, citing to Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,392, 179 P.3d 352,355 (Ct. App. 2008). R.,p. 
465. The District Comi then, properly, stated "the Boswells failed to establish that Mary Steele had 
a recognizable duty to Mr. Boswell." R., p. 465. The District Comi then, as it properly should have, 
discussed the issue of premises liability, in relation to the duties owed to an invitee and licensee. R., 
p. 465-66. What the Boswells fail to recognize is that premises liability is a fonn of negligence, and 
the duty owed is detennined on the status of the person entering the premises, i.e. invitee, to whom 
the owner owes a duty to keep the premises safe and warn of hidden or concealed dangers and 
licensee, or social guest, to whom a landlord only owes a duty to disclose known dangerous 
conditions or activities on the land. The District Comi went through this analysis, citing to Bates 
v. EIRMC, 114 Idaho 252,253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988), Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535,545, 
347 P.2d 341, 347 (1959) and Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 P.2d 371 (1929), and 
detennined, based on the undisputed facts in the record, that Mr. Boswell was not an invitee, but a 
licensee or social guest, as he was not confening any business, commercial or monetary or other 
tangible benefit to Mary Steele. R.,466. The District Court then went on to properly detennine that 
as the Boswells failed to establish evidence that Mary Steele breached her duty, as the record was 
undisputed that Zoey was behind a gate in the kitchen, in an enclosed area, where she was supposed 
to be, and it was Mr. Boswell who approached Zoey, on his own accord, putting his closed fist to 
Zoey and was bitten. R., p. 466. In denying the Boswells' motion for reconsideration, the Dist1ict 
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Court con-ectly and succinctly stated the Boswells failed to meet their burden in establishing 
negligence, reasoning: 
Although Defendants knew of the prior bites by the dog, they also knew of 
the circumstances of these bites and were not on notice that they were 
harboring a dangerous animal. In addition, the injuries received by the 
Plaintiff occun-ed as the result of his approaching the dog which was behind 
a closed gate. Plaintiffs actions were a proximate cause of his own injuries. 
R., p. 487. Again, the record clearly shows the Boswells failed to meet their burden on summary 
judgment, and that the District Comi properly granted summary judgment to Mary Steele and Amber 
Steele. 
2. The Boswells failed to meet the elements of their negligence per se claims. 
The Boswells asserted negligence per sepursuant to Pocatello City Code 6.04.050 and Idaho 
Code §25-2805. On both of those matters, the Boswells failed to meet each element to establish 
their negligence per se claims, thereby entitling Mary Steele and Amber Steele to summary 
judgment. 
As the District Court stated in its decision, to establish a claim for negligence per se, a 
plaintiff must show that:(1) the statute or regulation clearly defines the required standard of conduct; 
(2) that the statute or regulation is intended to prevent the type of hann the defendant's act or 
omission caused; (3) the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute or regulation was 
designed to protect; and ( 4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. R., p. 485( citing 
Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257,262,245 P.3d 1009, 1014 (2011); 0 'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 
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Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005); Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 
(2001). 
Pocatello City Code 6.04.050 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
A. Dangerous Conduct By Animal Prohibited: The owner or custodian of any 
animal which commits any of the acts defined in this chapter as "dangerous" 
may be cited for a misdemeanor and the animal control depmiment may 
seize and impound the animal until the matter has been adjudicated. The 
conduct shall not be deemed dangerous if the victim (person, domestic 
animal, or livestock) was committing a tort against the animal's 
owner/custodian, or committing a trespass or other tort on the premises of the 
animal's owner/custodian. Specifically prohibited are the following acts: 
1. If unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening manner by any 
person, approaching said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the 
streets, sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas within 
subdivisions or mobile home or recreational vehicle parks, common grounds 
of apartment buildings, condominiums, or townhouse developments, or 
private property not solely owned or possessed by the owner or custodian of 
the animal; or 
2. Biting, inflicting injmy, assaulting, or otherwise attacking a human being 
or domestic c animal or livestock without justifiable provocation. 
B. Prohibited Animals: No person may own or harbor or have custodial care 
of any of the following types of vicious animals: 
1. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to 
attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of 
human beings or domestic animals or livestock, unless restrained and/or 
confined as provided in section 6.04.060 of this chapter[ ... ] 
E. Owner Liability: An adult owner/custodian of a dangerous animal shall be 
liable for all injuries and prope1iy damage sustained by any person or by any 
animal caused by an unprovoked attack by any dangerous animal, plus 
all costs, civil judgments or penalties, c1iminal fines, final tenns, veterinary 
fees, shelter impound fees, and any other penalties and orders.[Emphasis 
supplied]. 
Pocatello City Ordinance 6.04.060 sets f01ih restraint requirements, stating that, "[t]he 
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owner/custodian of any animal convicted of a violation of the dangerous conduct prohibitions set 
out in this chapter shall complete the requirements of this subsection and subsection B .... " 
Sections 6.04.050A and B provide that a person cannot harbor a dangerous animal only after an 
animal is "adjudicated" as dangerous. Further, this is supp01ied by the language of section 6.04.060 
mandates restraint of a dangerous animal where "the owner/custodian of any animal convicted of 
a violation of the dangerous conduct prohibitions .... " [Emphasis supplied]. 
Likewise, LC. §25-2805 provides that a vicious dog is a dog, "which, when not physically 
provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing 
.... " and that, "[p]ersons guilty of a violation of this subsection ... shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor." [Emphasis supplied]. 
The District Court found the Pocatello City Code failed to comply with the first prong of the 
negligence per se analysis, which requires that the "regulation clearly defines the required standard 
of conduct." Deficient in the code were definitions of what constitutes "provocation" or what 
"threatening manner by any person" means. R., p. 486. Thus, the Boswells' reliance on the city 
code is faulty and that aspect of their negligence per se claim was properly dismissed. 
Additionally, the District Court properly noted that the record was void of any facts showing 
Amber Steele or Mary Steele knew Zoey was vicious or dangerous or that the attack was 
unprovoked. This compo1is with the aforementioned codes and statute. Sections 6.04.050A and B 
provide that a person cannot harbor a dangerous animal only after an animal is "adjudicated" as 
dangerous. Fmiher, section 6.05.060 mandates restraint of a dangerous animal where "the 
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owner/custodian of any animal [is] convicted of a violation of the dangerous conduct 
prohibitions .... " Likewise, §25-2805 provides that a vicious dog is a dog, "which, when not 
physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not 
trespassing .... " and that, "[p ]ersons guilty of a violation of this subsection ... shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor." [Emphasis supplied]. Again, there was no factual dispute that there had been no 
adjudication that Zoey was found to be dangerous or vicious. Further, Mr. Boswell admitted, on his 
own, and without telling Mary, he approached Zoey, with a closed fist, and put his closed fist to her 
face. This certainly qualifies as provocation, thereby negating any basis for Plaintiffs' negligence 
per se claims, which the District Court properly recognized as undisputed. 
Furihennore, the District Court found that the fourth prong of the negligence per se analysis, 
that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, was not met by the Boswells. Again, as the 
record unequivocally shows, Mr. Boswell approached Zoey, extended his ann beyond the gate that 
enclosed her in the kitchen and it was his conduct that was the proximate cause of his injury. R., p. 
486. It cmmot be overstated that Mr. Boswell admitted, on his own, and without telling Mary, he 
approached Zoey, with a closed fist ( despite attempting to contradict this testimony in his 
inadmissible affidavit), and put his closed fist to her face. R., 219-20 (Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 29, 
1.7-p. 33, 1.5) 
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Additionally, the Boswells' argument that the District Comi should have addressed non-
binding decisions from other jurisdictions lack merit. Again, those decisions are non-binding, and 
not consistent with Idaho law. Thus, the District Court c01Tectly granted summary judgment and this 
Court should affinn that decision. 
3. There is no private cause of action under Idaho Code § 25-2805 or Pocatello 
City Codes §§ 6.04.050 and 6.04.060. 
It is patently obvious, in reviewing the city codes and Idaho statute asse1ied by the Boswells 
there is no plivate cause of action, either express or implied. "When a statute is silent regarding 
p1ivate enforcement, courts may recognize a p1ivate right only when it is necessary to assure 
effectiveness of the statute." Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 908 P.2d 1228 
(1995); White v. UnigardMut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 101, 730 P.2d 1014, 1021 (1986)). Likewise, 
this Court has held that there was no private cause of action for an insured who sought to sue its 
insurer under criminal statutes for obstruction of justice, bribery and corrupt influences, reasoning 
that those statutes were not designed to protect any special class of persons, only the general public, 
and that there was no legislative intent to create a private cause of action through those statutes. 
Yoakumv.HartfordFirelns. Co., 129Idaho 171,176,923 P.2d416,421 (1996). It is clear that a 
private cause of action is unnecessary to give effect to §§ 25-2805 or Pocatello City Codes §§ 
6.04.050 and 6.04.060. Those statutes do not establish any right of the Boswells, either express or 
implied, and are expressly limited to criminal sanctions. The Boswells" attempt to invoke a private 
right under the statutes is an attempt to asse1i a criminal statute in a civil action, which was expressly 
prohibited by the Court in Yoakum, supra. If the Idaho legislature or Pocatello City wanted to 
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provide for a private cause of action tlu·ough Idaho Code § 25-2805 and Pocatello City Codes 
§§6.04.050 and 6.04.060, they could have expressly provided for civil remedies, but only set fo1ih 
criminal remedies. As a result, since those statutes do not provide for a private cause of action, the 
Court should find this as an additional basis for dismissal of the Boswells' claims. 
D. THERE IS NO FACTUAL DISPUTE THAT AMBER STEELE DID NOT 
OWN THE PROPERTY WHERE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRt\NTED TO HER. 
The Boswells have not put fmih any facts disputing Amber Steele was not an owner of the 
premises where the incident occmTed. They also fail to cite to any case law contrary to the case law 
cited by Amber Steele that only a landowner owes a duty to a person entering the premises, subject 
to the person's status as an invitee, licensee or trespasser. See, supra, at 18-19. As Amber Steele 
did not own the premises, summary judgment was properly granted to her. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
TAMARA ANDERSEN. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56fe) provides, in pe1iinent paii, as follows: 
Suppmiing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set fo1ih such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affinnatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. 
Additionally, Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 provides: 
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the detern1ination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
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Rule 402 provides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these 
rules or by other rules applicable in the couiis of this state. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 404 provides: 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted 
in confom1ity therewith on a paiiicular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pe1iinent trait of the accused's 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim 
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, 
or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608 and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the 
person acted in confom1ity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppo1iunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that 
the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the comi excuses pretrial notice on good 
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
Fuiiher, as to testimony of witnesses, lay and expert testimony "is governed by the rules of 
evidence regarding the opinion testimony oflaywitnesses and experts under Idaho Rules of Evidence 
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701 and 702." I.R.E. 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to dete1mine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expe1i by knowledge, skill, expeiience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the fonn of an opinion or otherwise. 
However, expert testimony that is based on speculation, is not admissible under Rule 702. 
Speculation, as it relates to expe1i testimony is defined as "the art of theoiizing about a matter as to 
which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 564, 97 
P .3d 428, 432 (2004). 
An expert opinion that is speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record 
is inadmissible because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or detennine a fact that is at issue. Expert opinion that merely 
suggests possibilities would only invite conjecture and may be properly 
excluded." 
Id. [Emphasis added] [Internal citations omitted]. See also Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11,205 
P .3d 660 (2009) ( expert opinions are only admissible if they assist the trier of fact in understanding 
the evidence or detennining an issue of fact); Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834,838, 
153 P .3d 1180, 1184 (2007) ( expert opinion that is speculative, conclusory or unsubstantiated by 
facts in the record does not assist the jury and is inadmissible). 
Ms. Andersen's affidavit was conclusory, lacked foundation and was based on speculation. 
R., pp. 78-80. For example, in paragraph 11, Ms. Andersen failed to provide any foundation as to 
her conclusion what a "previous bite" was. R., p. 79. Fmiher, in paragraph 12, Ms. Andersen's 
statement is based on her unfounded premise Amber Steele was not honest with her, which is a 
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credibility issue for a jury to decide, not something to which Ms. Andersen can provide testimony. 
R.,p. 79. See, State v. Pany, 150 Idaho 209, 229, 245 P .3d 961, 981 (2010). The avennent was also 
based on speculation and should be stricken. Fmiher, paragraphs 13-1 7 were based on pure 
speculation. R., pp. 79-80. Ms. Andersen never examined or conducted any personal evaluation 
of Zoey, and, in essence, she tried to say that Zoey had the propensity or habit of biting people, 
without foundation, which led to Mr. Boswell's being bitten, which violates Idaho Rule of Evidence 
404. Ms. Andersen apparently did not supplement her affidavit, as after she submitted it, she could 
have read the deposition of Mr. Boswell, who admitted he approached and reached over to Zoey 
with a closed fist. Thus, Ms. Andersen's opinions lacked foundation and were conclusory. The 
District Court c01Tectly concluded that such opinions were conclusory, reasoning that Ms. Andersen 
failed to make any additional study of Zoey' s behavior or other witnesses, as well as her "unfounded 
conclusion that Amber 'lied' to her at the time of the incident." R., pp. 465-66. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY QUASHED THE DEPOSITION 
SUBPOENA OF JOHN BILLQUIST. 
Mr. Billquist, a fonner adjuster for Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's insurer, State Fann, 
never made a witness of himself. Rather, Mr. Billquist \Vrote a letter to the Boswells' attorney, in 
response to their settlement demand. Thus, the letter he sent was not admissible pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 408, which prohibits the admission of settlement discussions. It states: 
Evidence of (I) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting, 
offering, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising 
or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity 
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or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of 
the claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not 
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because 
it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule does not 
require exclusion if the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as 
proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue 
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Compromise negotiations encompass mediation. 
At the hearing on July 16, 2013, the District Comi concluded that Mr. Billquist could not be 
deposed about the letter, citing the Court's holding from Dabestani v. Bellus, 131 Idaho 542, 961 
P .2d. 633 (1998), which precluded the disclosure, under the work product privilege, of an adjuster's 
statement of another party. Tr., p. 10. Further, Mr. Billquist' s letter was a settlement discussion, as 
clearly, the first paii of the letter stated, "This letter is in response to your demand of August 29, 
2012. R., 77. I.R.E. expressly prohibits the letter and Mr. Billquist's deposition. 
Additionally, there was no waiver of any attorney client or work product privilege as the 
Boswells' argue. While not cited by the Boswells in their opening brief on appeal, below, they cited 
to Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417,420,565 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1977), where this Comi cited to the 
U.S. Supreme Comi, Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 US 464, 470-71 (1888), for the well-settled principle 
that the attorney client privilege "is that of the client alone .... " Additionally, Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 502( c) also specifically provides that only the client may asse1i the privilege: 
Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client or 
for the client through the client's lawyer, the guardian or conservator, or by 
the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or 
similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, 
whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer or the lawyer's 
representative at the time of the communication may claim the privilege but 
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only on behalf of the client. The authority of the lawyer or lawyer's 
representative to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
Furthem1ore, Idaho Rule of Evidence 510, related to waiver of privilege by voluntary 
disclosure provides that the holder of the privilege waives such privilege when the holder 
"voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant paii of the matter or 
communication." 
In this matter, the Boswells have not provided any evidence establishing that Mary Steele or 
Amber Steele waived the attorney client or work product privileges. The District Court previously 
and correctly found that the work product privilege set forth in Dabestani, barred the deposition of 
Mr. Billquist, and his letter in no way was a waiver of any privilege. Fmiher, Mr. Billquist was not 
a witness, and had no personal knowledge of the Chris Kettler incident. Ultimately, the District 
Court c01Tectly found that the record clearly showed that neither privilege had been waived. 
G. AMBER STEELE AND MARY STEELE, NOT THE Bos,vELLS, ARE 
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
Amber Steele and Mary Steele are entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code§ 
12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. In addition, Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 allow 
for the award of attorney's fees and costs in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously, 
unreasonably and without foundation. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 
(2006). Additionally, I.A.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing pmiy on appeal. 
It is patently clear the Boswells have pursued their claims fiivolously, unreasonably and 
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without foundation. The law is well settled that there is no strict liability in dog bite cases in Idaho, 
and the record is abundantly clear that the Boswells failed to meet their burden of establishing their 
negligence, negligence per se and premises liability claims. Based upon the aforementioned statute 
and rules, as well as I.A.R. 40, No1ihwest is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants/Respondents Amber Steele and Mary Steele request that 
the Comi affinn the District Cami's grant of summary judgment to them, dismissing 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Stephen Boswell's and Karina Boswell's claims, in their entirety, with 
prejudice. Defendants/Respondents fmiher request the Comi award them their attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal. 
DATED this.d.7day of September, 2014. 
COOPER & LARSEN CHARTERED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
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